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Rudkin Testamentary Trust —
A Response to Prof. Cohen
By Douglas A. Kahn
In the August 3 issue of Tax Notes,1 Prof. Stephen
Cohen wrote an article about Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s
opinions in three tax cases. Of those three cases, only the
opinion she wrote in William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust
v. Commissioner, 467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006), Doc 2006-
21522, 2006 TNT 203-4, is worthy of comment. Although
the Second Circuit’s decision in that case was affirmed by
the Supreme Court under the name Knight v. Commis-
sioner,2 the construction of the critical statutory language
that Justice Sotomayor adopted was rejected and criti-
cized by Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous
court. Cohen concluded that Justice Sotomayor’s con-
struction of the statutory language is ‘‘at least as valid as,
and probably preferable to, the construction adopted by
the Supreme Court’’ and that Chief Justice Roberts’s
criticism of Justice Sotomayor’s rationale is ‘‘logically
flawed.’’ Cohen also said that Chief Justice Roberts’s
criticism of Justice Sotomayor’s opinion is ‘‘unpersuasive
and overstated.’’ In my view, the construction adopted by
Justice Sotomayor was incorrect, and Chief Justice Rob-
erts’s criticism was persuasive and accurately stated.
Moreover, based on policy considerations, a plausible
case can be made that the courts could have construed
the statute differently, resulting in a decision for the
taxpayer.
Rudkin involved a trust with a large amount of capital.
The trustees employed an investment-management firm
to provide advice to the trustees.3 The issue in the case
was whether the fees paid to the investment-
management firm were fully deductible by the trust or
whether their deduction was subject to the limitation
imposed by section 67(a), which denies a deduction for
some expenses. Those expenses, called miscellaneous
itemized deductions, are deductible only to the extent
that they total more than 2 percent of the taxpayer’s
adjusted gross income. The question presented in Rudkin
was whether the trust’s investment-management fees
were subject to that restriction.
An individual’s AGI is equal to his gross income
minus his deductions, not including itemized deduc-
tions, standard deductions, and personal exemptions. It
is clear that expenses for investment advice are a miscel-
laneous itemized deduction. Consequently, if the invest-
ment counseling expenses had been incurred by an
individual, they would have been subject to the 2 percent
of AGI limitation. As we shall see, the issue becomes
more complex when the expense is incurred by a trust.
The government contended that the investment fees
paid by the trust were subject to the 2 percent of AGI
limitation. Section 67(a) states that it applies ‘‘in the case
of an individual’’; a trust is not an individual. While
section 67(c) would apply to some expenses of a trust,
that provision was not relevant to the case. The applica-
tion of section 67(a) turned on the construction of section
67(e). Section 67(e) does not expressly make section 67(a)
applicable to trusts, but the only reasonable inference
from that subsection is that the 2 percent of AGI limita-
tion sometimes applies to trusts. Unless there is a special
provision in the code, a trust or estate does not have AGI
— that is, ordinarily, that concept does not apply to a
trust or estate. Section 67(e) provides how the AGI of an
estate or trust should be computed for purposes of
section 67. The only possible reason for providing for a
determination of AGI of a trust for purposes of that
section (the section of the code dealing with the limita-
tion on miscellaneous itemized deductions) is to apply
the 2 percent of AGI limitation to trusts. Accordingly,
section 67(e) has been construed as applying the miscel-
laneous itemized deduction limitation to trusts.4
Section 67(e) states that for purposes of that section,
the AGI of a trust shall be computed in the same manner
as that of an individual, with two exceptions. The con-
struction of one of those exceptions, section 67(e)(1), was
the central issue in Rudkin. Section 67(e)(1) excludes from
the miscellaneous itemized deduction category (and thus
from the 2 percent of AGI limitation):
the deductions for costs which are paid or incurred
in connection with the administration of the estate
or trust and which would not have been incurred if the
property were not held in such trust or estate. [Empha-
sis added.]
The results in Rudkin were based on the construction
of the italicized portion of that quotation. Clearly, the
investment advisory expenses were incurred in connec-
tion with the administration of the trust. Therefore, they
would not be subject to the 2 percent of AGI limitation
unless they were held to fail to be expenses ‘‘which
would not have been incurred if the property were not
held in such trust or estate.’’ The application of that
provision had been resolved by three circuits before the
issue reached Justice Sotomayor. The Sixth Circuit held
that those investment advisory expenses were not subject
to the limitation and were fully deductible.5 However, the
Fourth Circuit6 and the Federal Circuit7 held that the
limitation does apply. In Rudkin the Tax Court held that
1‘‘Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s Tax Opinions,’’ Tax Notes, Aug. 3,
2009, p. 474, Doc 2009-15953, 2009 TNT 146-12.
2552 U.S. 181 (2008), Doc 2008-948, 2008 TNT 12-6.
3The trustees maintained that they were required by the
Connecticut version of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act to
employ an investment adviser.
4See, e.g., Knight v. Commissioner, 522 U.S. 181.
5O’Neill v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993), Doc
93-6321, 93 TNT 118-14.
6Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2003), Doc
2003-11125, 2003 TNT 86-1.
7Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir.
2001), Doc 2001-23461, 2001 TNT 176-10.
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the limitation does apply to the investment advisory
expenses.8 The trust appealed to the Second Circuit.
Justice Sotomayor wrote the opinion for herself and
Judge Hall.9 She rejected the Sixth Circuit’s approach and
held that the investment advisory expenses were subject
to the limitation, affirming the Tax Court’s decision. The
Second Circuit agreed with the results reached by the
Fourth and Federal circuits and by the Tax Court. How-
ever, in her opinion, Justice Sotomayor rejected the
construction of the critical statutory language that had
been adopted in the other two circuits and by the Tax
Court. The question the courts disagreed on was how to
determine whether the expense would not have been
incurred if the property were not held in trust. The other
courts had construed that language as satisfied only
when the expense is one that is commonly or customarily
incurred by individuals. Rejecting that view, the Second
Circuit held that the full deduction applies only to
expenses that could not have been incurred by an indi-
vidual. So, according to the Second Circuit’s view, if a
trust’s expense is one that an individual could incur,
regardless of how unlikely and unusual it might be for an
individual to incur that type of expense, the expense will
be subject to the 2 percent of AGI limitation.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court affirmed
the Second Circuit and held for the government. How-
ever, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court
repudiated Justice Sotomayor’s construction of the statu-
tory language and criticized that approach.10 Instead the
Supreme Court adopted the approach of the other two
circuits and held that the statute subjected trust expenses
that were customarily or commonly incurred by indi-
viduals to the 2 percent of AGI limitation. The Court
determined that fees for investment advice are com-
monly incurred by individuals, and so it affirmed the
decision. Let us now consider the merits of Justice
Sotomayor’s and Chief Justice Roberts’s opposing con-
structions.
Justice Sotomayor construed the pertinent statutory
language by effectively substituting the word ‘‘could’’ for
the word ‘‘would.’’ The Second Circuit effectively re-
wrote the statute to read ‘‘and which could [would] not
have been incurred if the property were not held in such
trust or estate.’’ As Chief Justice Roberts noted, the word
‘‘would’’ in the statute requires a prediction whether an
expense would have been incurred by individuals who
hold that property in their individual status. Because the
property is held in trust, and is not held by an individual,
the statute leaves open the question of what standard
should be used to determine whether the expense is one
that an individual holding the property would make.
Justice Sotomayor held that no prediction of likely be-
havior was appropriate. Rather, the test should be one of
impossibility. Only when it is impossible for an indi-
vidual to incur an expense, will it be found that the
expense would not have been incurred outside of the
trust.
It is possible, as the Second Circuit did, to read the
statute as requiring 100 percent certainty that an expense
would not be incurred. Under that construction, only
when there is no possibility, however remote, that an
expense would be incurred by an individual, will it
escape the 2 percent of AGI limitation; but that is a
cramped and strained construction of the actual language
chosen by Congress. If that is what was intended by
Congress, it seems far more likely that they would have
used the word ‘‘could’’ instead of ‘‘would.’’ While it is
possible that Congress was simply careless in its choice of
words, the statutory language should be given its more
natural meaning unless it contravenes a policy underly-
ing the statute. No such policy was suggested by the
court, and none seems applicable.
The other courts, including the Supreme Court,
adopted a standard of considering whether some ex-
penses are common and ordinary for individuals to incur.
So, if those expenses are rare, unusual, or extraordinary
for individuals, the trust can deduct them in full. As
Cohen and several other commentators have pointed out,
that standard leaves open questions of application and is
less predictable than a bright-line standard, such as
impossibility. But certainty is only one consideration in
adopting tax laws and is often outweighed by other
factors. There are numerous examples of when a tidy,
bright-line rule has been rejected in favor of a more
nuanced but less mechanical and less predictable rule. In
Duberstein, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s
proposal for a bright-line definition of gift in favor of the
vaguer standard of ‘‘detached and disinterested generos-
ity.’’11 Another example is the standard employed in
determining whether the cost of clothes that an employee
wears at work can qualify as a deductible uniform. The
three-part test adopted by the commissioner and by the
courts for deductibility is: the clothing is required as a
condition of employment; it is not adaptable to general
use; and is not so worn. The second requirement of not
adaptable for general use is determined by resorting to
community standards rather than to the subjective
standards of the individual employee.12
Cohen and Justice Sotomayor characterize the stand-
ard of customary behavior by individuals that was
applied to section 67(e)(2) by the other courts, including
the Supreme Court, as a subjective standard. A standard
that looks to community practices is based on objective
facts, even though they are not as easily determined as
most bright-line standards. By way of comparison, the
standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Pevsner (the
deduction of clothing case) looked to community behav-
ior, and the court characterized that as an objective
standard. A standard does not become subjective merely
because it cannot be applied mechanically.
8Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 304 (2d
Cir. 2005), Doc 2005-13960, 2005 TNT 123-9.
9The third judge recused himself after oral argument was
held.
10A contention of the trust that was rejected by both the
Second Circuit and the Supreme Court had little merit and is
omitted from this discussion.
11Commissioner v. Duberstein, 63 U.S. 278 (1960).
12Pevsner v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Admittedly, as written, the statute leaves room for
construction, which is true of most statutes. Mechanically
drawn bright lines have administrative convenience, but
also have disadvantages that have to be weighed. Those
disadvantages include lack of flexibility, inability to ac-
commodate changing circumstances, and vulnerability to
manipulation. The choice between adopting a bright-line
or a nuanced standard is one that legislators often face. In
some cases in the tax area, Congress has chosen to adopt
a bright line, but more frequently, a nuanced approach is
adopted. It is a trade-off of convenience for a more
judicious application of rules.
Chief Justice Roberts noted that it was likely that
Congress would have used the word ‘‘could’’ rather than
‘‘would’’ if it had intended to require impossibility as a
standard. When Congress wants a bright-line standard, it
knows how to draft the statute to do that. Cohen points
out that Congress could have drafted section 67(e)(1) to
more clearly accord with the Supreme Court’s construc-
tion if it had added the word ‘‘customarily’’ after the
words ‘‘would not.’’ So, the statute would have read
‘‘would not customarily have been incurred.’’ That
would have avoided any ambiguity. Or, if Congress
intended the impossibility standard, it could have added
the word ‘‘ever’’ after ‘‘would not’’ so that the language
would read ‘‘would not ever have been incurred.’’ Cohen
correctly notes that the failure of Congress to add either
of those two words no more supports the Supreme
Court’s construction than it does Justice Sotomayor’s.
But, that is not the point that Chief Justice Roberts made.
He did not raise the question of why a word was missing
when its addition would have clarified the issue. Rather,
he asked why Congress chose the word ‘‘would’’ when
the word ‘‘could’’ would have been more precise if that
was Congress’s intent, especially because ‘‘could’’ is far
from being an obscure term.
A vast number of tax statutes would have been more
precise if a word or phrase had been added. In construing
those statutes, not much weight can be given to the
omission of those words. However, Congress’s choice of
one word instead of another highly accessible word that
would have given a different meaning to the provision is
very significant.
Cohen gives some weight to the fact that after Justice
Sotomayor issued her opinion, Treasury promulgated a
proposed regulation adopting her view; and the solicitor
general argued her view in his brief in the Supreme
Court. Cohen considers those adoptions to have ‘‘af-
firmed the validity, and perhaps the superiority, of Justice
Sotomayor’s approach.’’ The significance of Treasury’s
temporary adoption of Justice Sotomayor’s view is mini-
mized by the fact that Treasury often takes into consid-
eration, when choosing the position it takes on an issue,
which position will increase the amount of revenue
collected — that is, it takes the position that favors its
interests. Justice Sotomayor’s construction would both
increase revenue collection and serve administrative ease
of enforcement, and so it is not surprising that Treasury
would favor that position. Perhaps that was not the
reason that Treasury promulgated its proposed regula-
tion in this case, but that possibility reduces the signifi-
cance of its adoption. As for the solicitor general’s brief,
it is not unusual for an advocate to urge, on review in a
higher court, the position that the lower court took in
deciding the case in favor of the advocate’s client. As to
both Treasury’s and the solicitor general’s actions, Co-
hen’s view that the approval of a court’s holding by the
winning party demonstrates the validity of that holding
is extraordinary to the point of being bizarre.
Chief Justice Roberts makes a strong point in support
of his construction of the statute that if the second clause
of section 67(e)(1), which is the clause in question, were
construed as Justice Sotomayor did, it would render the
first clause of that provision meaningless. The first clause
requires that the expense in question, to be fully deduct-
ible, be incurred in connection with the administration of
the trust. If the second clause of that provision is con-
strued to mean that only expenses that cannot be made
by individuals are fully deductible, that would swallow
the first requirement, rendering it superfluous. No ex-
penses that would be deductible by the trust and that
could not be incurred by individuals could fail to be
connected with the administration of the trust. Cohen
responds to that point by suggesting that the first clause
serves to divorce section 67(e)(1) from the second excep-
tion in section 67(e)(2). Section 67(e)(2) provides a full
deduction for the personal exemptions allowed to a trust
or estate and to the deduction for distributions made to
beneficiaries. Of course, neither of those deductions
should be subject to the 2 percent of AGI limitation.
Personal exemptions for individuals are not itemized
deductions and so are not subject to the 2 percent of AGI
limitation, and neither should be the personal exemp-
tions of a trust or estate. The deduction for distributions
to beneficiaries is merely carrying out the conduit el-
ement of trusts and estates and should not be limited in
amount. However, the first clause of section 67(e)(1) is
not needed to divorce that paragraph from the deduc-
tions mentioned in section 67(e)(2). If the first clause were
eliminated, section 67(e)(1) would read ‘‘the deduction
for costs which would not have been incurred if the
property were not held in such trust or estate.’’ The costs
mentioned in that provision cannot apply to the deduc-
tions listed in section 67(e)(2) because none of those
deductions involve a cost. The items listed in paragraph
(2) are personal exemptions and distributions to benefi-
ciaries, which are not costs in any sense. It would seem
that Chief Justice Roberts is correct in saying that the
Second Circuit’s construction of the second clause makes
the first clause superfluous.
Finally, let us consider a policy consideration that
appears to bear on this issue. The statute clearly evi-
dences a policy to allow a full deduction for fees paid to
a trustee for performing its fiduciary services. The ulti-
mate question in the instant case was whether the cost of
investment advice to a trustee is fully deductible. The
final decision about what investments are to be made
with the trust’s assets is made by the trustee. If the trustee
chooses not to employ an investment adviser, it will act
on its own analysis of the market. Even if it obtains
advice, the trustee makes the final decision on invest-
ment. So, part of the trustee’s fee is received for deter-
mining the management and investment of the trust’s
funds. Yet, all of the trustee’s fees are fully deductible.
Suppose that a trustee were to reduce its fee because it
purchased the advice of an investor-management firm. It
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seems incongruous to deny a deduction for the invest-
ment counseling fee in that case when it is merely a
substitute for a portion of the trustee’s fee, which would
have been fully deductible. Even if the trustee does not
reduce its fee, should the deduction for the investment
counseling fee be restricted when the firm is conducting
a function that is an essential element of the trustee’s
fiduciary obligations? It would seem that investment
analysis is such an integral part of a trustee’s function
that whether it is conducted by the trustee personally or
by an outside agent, the cost of that function should be
fully deductible.
While the language of the statute is not easily recon-
ciled with a construction that would allow a full deduc-
tion for expenses incurred for activities that are elements
of the basic function of a trustee, it would seem that tax
policy is better served by that approach. There are
numerous examples in the tax law of statutory construc-
tions that serve tax policies but are contrary to the literal
terms of the statute. For example, section 102(c) explicitly
prevents exclusion from an employee’s gross income of
transfers the employee received from his employer. Not-
withstanding the literal terms of that statutory provision,
prop. reg. section 1.102-1(f)(2) exempts from that statu-
tory provision extraordinary transfers by an employer to
an employee who is a natural object of the employer’s
bounty if the transfer was not made in connection with
the employment. While the statute provides no hint of
such an exception, the proposed regulation creates one
that provides flexibility to otherwise overly broad and
strict statutory language.
While those considerations point to allowing a full
deduction for the trust’s investment fees, the Supreme
Court’s decision closes that door. Nevertheless, those
considerations suggest that the inflexible and narrow
approach taken by Justice Sotomayor is inappropriate as
well as contrary to a natural reading of the statute. The
Supreme Court’s construction provides flexibility to al-
low courts to deal with situations that clearly fall outside
of the areas at which the 2 percent of AGI limitation is
aimed.
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